I marked it. It starts at the 41 minute mark.
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40:12–42:53 — Alleged German nuclear test: He cites the “Zinsser Affidavit,” describing pilot Hans Zinsser allegedly witnessing an explosion in early 1945 with an intense flash, colored/rainbow effects, a pressure wave, and flattened trees. He then cites Italian journalist Luigi Romersa, who allegedly witnessed a German weapons demonstration on a Baltic island with Axis representatives present.
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43:17–44:17 — Claim that the Manhattan Project lacked enough material: Jorjani cites Carter Plymton Hydrick’s Critical Mass, saying Hydrick argued the U.S. did not have sufficient fissile material for Trinity plus the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs until after Germany surrendered. He also claims the U.S. was still having difficulty with the plutonium implosion design.
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44:17–45:30 — German submarine/uranium claim: He says a German U-boat arrived carrying uranium and also an expert knowledgeable about plutonium-bomb detonation. He interprets this as an agreed transfer of German nuclear technology to the United States and goes much further, claiming that America effectively “got the nuclear bomb from Nazi Germany.”
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45:42–48:25 — “Clean fusion” claim: Jorjani argues that Germany may have developed a fusion weapon that did not require a fission/atomic-bomb trigger. He connects this to German physicist Ronald Richter, who worked for Juan Perón in Argentina after the war and claimed to be developing controlled fusion. Jorjani argues that such a weapon could explain an alleged German nuclear explosion without the expected radioactive signature.
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48:25–49:50 — The Bell connection: He connects this proposed fusion technology to the alleged Nazi Die Glocke (“The Bell”) project, involving high voltages, electromagnetism, mercury and thorium. His theory is that this research may have produced a way to initiate fusion electromagnetically rather than with a conventional fission bomb.
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49:59–50:45 — Why didn’t Germany use it? Jorjani speculates that if Germany achieved this breakthrough in late 1944 or early 1945, Nazi officials may have chosen to use the technology as a bargaining chip with the Western Allies rather than deploy it militarily as Germany collapsed. He wonders whether technology and scientists were exchanged as part of a larger undisclosed arrangement.