Originally published at: IS IRAN THE TARGET OF WEATHER WAR?
There is an intriguing, and hugely suggestive, article over at Zero Hedge that was spotted by premier Gizar article-spotter, V.T., and it raises the question of weather manipulation technologies in a very stark way: “We May Have To Evacuate Tehran”: Iranian President’s Remarks Stun Amid Water Crisis Note the following from the article: Coming off a…
I had the same thoughts myself. The smarmy comments by Bibi about IS engineers standing by to ‘help’ Iran with it’s water crisis a couple months back may have planted that seed.
Iran should crank up it’s de-salination capability. Hmm they could possibly use nuclear energy to do that. BTW the salinity of Black Sea waters is about half that of the rest of the oceans so sourcing water from there would make sense.
But wait! The recent activity in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkmenistan (source of much of IS oil) may have a dual purpose: to block or control a pipeline to source this water. The “Trump Corridor” designed to ensure a trade path controlled by western forces is quite possibly related to this geopolitical pincer movement.
Oddly this hit my email same day as Dr Farrell’s post. A touch long but likely relevant.
With rainfall 85% below average and key reservoirs now circling the drain, Iran’s six consecutive years of drought are taking their toll. What’s going on?
The country’s average temperatures have risen 1.5°C+ since the 1970s, driving drier conditions that make extreme droughts more likely. Iran itself has also made things worse by mismanaging its groundwater, subsidising water-intensive crops, and building too many dams, while sanctions have curbed some access to better tech and infrastructure.
The answer? Authorities are already rationing water in parts, with Tehran residents now seeing water pressure dip at night, but this might just be the start. The president has even flagged the possibility of evacuating the capital’s 10 million locals as a last resort — this seems logistically infeasible, but it gives you a sense of the panic.
So for now, authorities are relying on the power of positive thinking and cloud seeding (spraying chemicals to trigger rain), though it might not be enough.
Aside from the humanitarian hit, it’ll all further erode the regime’s dwindling credibility.
2. Putin’s pipedream
Russian scientists have reportedly (
) asked the Kremlin to fund a feasibility study on diverting water from Russia’s Ob river down to Central Asia.
The idea is to blow $100B on a massive plastic pipeline carrying up to 22 cubic km (5.3 cubic mi) of water through Kazakhstan and into Uzbekistan each year. Why?
First, the above Russian outlet (like most) aligns with Kremlin narratives, particularly since Berezkin took over in 2017. Putin doesn’t have a spare $100B or workforce for this project, but pumping out these articles helps project the guy as a historic nation-builder.
Second, this idea actually builds on a similar Soviet proposal from the 1970s to replenish the Aral Sea basin — wedged between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, it was once the fourth-largest body of inland water but is now mostly dried up due to agriculture.
And third, like that original 1970s proposal, this modern iteration would have the added benefit of not only helping alleviate Central Asia’s water crisis, but also offering Putin a new source of leverage over a region now looking to break from Moscow’s orbit.
Still, it’s a pipedream. Which will we get first, this Central Asian water pipeline or GTA 6?
3. India’s withdrawal
With so much going on, you might’ve missed the incredibly bland-sounding ‘Neutral Expert proceedings’ now happening in Vienna.
It’s part of India and Pakistan’s 1960 Indus River Treaty that regulates distribution of their shared basin. India paused its treaty participation after April’s terrorist attack by Pakistan-based extremists, but an international court basically found the treaty still holds.
And that’s what makes this week’s Vienna meeting intriguing: Pakistan is now there raising objections to hydroelectric projects planned by India, which isn’t there to respond.
But interestingly, it’s not a complete no-show by India: Delhi still shared river-flow data during the monsoon season, just via its embassy rather than the official treaty channel.
It’s a way of flexing its leverage while managing the humanitarian and reputational risks.
Intrigue’s Take
The century ahead may well reveal a future in which water replaces oil as the liquid most likely to trigger a conflict — but unlike oil, there aren’t alternatives to water. So how might this all play out?
We’re already seeing water haves and have-nots: upstream haves (like Ethiopia, India, and China) are making their downstream neighbours (Egypt, Pakistan, and Mekong nations) very nervous with more dams — hold back water (like China) and distant Mekong rice harvests and fisheries get hammered. Open the spigot and they get hit with floods.
At least in the India-Pakistan case, there’s a treaty providing some basic guardrails. As for the Mekong? Those Southeast Asian neighbours set up the Mekong River Commission in 1995, but guess who’s still not a full member? The upstream giant, China! Beijing prefers sitting in the driver’s seat of its own non-binding equivalent.
But you know what? As with energy, tech might expand our water options, too: just last month Israel started quietly pumping desalinated seawater into the Sea of Galilee, raising its drought-hit levels by 0.5cm a month in a world first. Throw in some cheap intermittent solar to power the pumps and desal, and all kinds of possibilities emerge.
Alternatively you could do nothing, though history offers plenty of examples (whether the Mayans, the Ming Dynasty, or Ancien Régime France) of eras partly washed away by drought