Long interview I have not completed, but appears an intelligent interview with more information than any previous stories. Comments are closed on the 18 Mar intro to this topic.
NEW VIDEO: UAPs swarm U.S. military base; How will Congress respond? | Reality Check (youtube.com)
ā¦ as before ā¦ let me know when we engage. Until there are actual weapons involved incidents such as these should be ignored. Nothing more than (Chinese?) trial balloons (every pun intended).
ā¦ if not an exercise then why no anti-aircraft response? Langley includes:
480th Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance Wing
The 480 ISR Wing operates and maintains the Air Force Distributed Common Ground System, or DCGS, also known as the āSentinelā weapon system, conducting imagery, cryptologic, and measurement and signatures intelligence activities.
The Wing is composed of the following units worldwide:
480th ISR Group, Fort Gordon, Ga.
497th ISR Group, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Va.
548th ISR Group, Beale Air Force Base, Calif.
692nd ISR Group, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii
693rd ISR Group, Ramstein Air Base, Germany
694th ISR Group, Osan Air Base, South Korea
and
The 363d ISR Wing is the targeting production, special operations ISR and full-spectrum analytical support to the tactical warfighter. The wing provides operations, planning and execution support to major commands and theater air and space operation centers. It provides geospatial and comprehensive threat analysis products to units employing airpower worldwide.
Yet no response? In the words of the great Maynard G. Krebs,
āCome now.ā
Every military organization uses the weapon systems / sensor systems provided for it by some contractor. USG specifies the performance of these systems, they are developed, bought / tested to ensure they perform to specification. If the āISRā systems they operate were not specified to detect / track / etc a phenomenon, thereās nothing the military organization can do. Donāt judge the merit of some existing military organization stood up to deal with X and Y threats against a threat no-one has ever seen before. Put yourself in their place. We donāt know what this is. Just because someone is not shooting at it doesnāt mean itās not of interest.
ā¦ If we DONT know what it is? ā¦ Surely there is some type of āsystemā to protect the facilities. So we havenāt thought about protecting facilities from drones? If not before now, then it is to late. Come Now!
surveillance systems perform within bands of frequency. IR, RF, etc. If the objects donāt emit or reflect energy within those bands, you canāt expect a surveillance system to detect them. How would you specify itās performance for development? How would you test it to verify it met spec? Think about how systems are developed. Would a contractor sign up to meet a ādetect any anomaly regardless of frequency, size, distance, speed, etc?ā. No. Huge performance risk to the contractor. Systems are developed to deal with known threat parameters. And then there are the filter settings. Set the filters too loose and youāre going on alert every time a bird or swarm of bees flies over the base or someone lights a cigaretteā¦too tight and you miss the alien mother ship hovering mid-runway. Surveillance systems arenāt magic, they have limitations.
Beyond that, the responses available to authorities have limitations. If you detected a cluster of 5lb drones, would you launch a $100M aircraft to āintercept itā? Is the aircraft slow enough to track it or with the fighter jet fall out of the sky at those slow speeds? Can the aircraft weapon system lock on to something that small? (probably notā¦filters) if it can, would you launch a $100K missile to shoot it down? Collateral damage over a populated area? Give military guards shotguns and let them practice skeet? The problem faced by the base authorities is not simple.